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The contributions made by the Italian mathematician Mario Pieri (1860–1913) are well known in the field of
geometry. Pieri was a member of the School of Peano at the University of Turin. There he became engaged both
by the problems of logic and by the philosophical aspects of Peano’s epistemology. This article was motivated
by Pieri’s address given at the University of Catania, at the inauguration of the 1906–1907 academic year.
My aim is to identify Pieri’s philosophical premises as found in his works and to present them in the general
framework of the historical development of the Peano School.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Riassunto
Com’è noto, i contributi del matematico italiano Mario Pieri (1860–1913) riguardano soprattutto la geome-
tria e i fondamenti della matematica. Tuttavia è utile ricordare che egli si forma nella scuola di Peano e ciò è
evidente nell’interesse che Pieri ha per i problemi della logica e per gli aspetti filosofici della sua epistemologia.
Lo scopo di questo articolo è, partendo dal discorso di Pieri per l’inaugurazione dell’anno accademico 1906–
1907 nell’Università di Catania, quello di individuare le premesse filosofiche della sua opera e d’inserirle nel
quadro generale dello sviluppo storico della scuola di Peano.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Pieri; Peano; Philosophy; Logic; Epistemology; ScienceIt is not easy to reconstruct the complex history of the mathematician Mario Pieri.1 To
better reach this aim, this study has been divided into two parts. In the first part, I will
describe the historical background of Italian mathematics at the end of the 19th century.
In the second part, I will discuss Pieri’s Address to illustrate his contributions to the fields
of logic and mathematics, and how they relate to those of others in Peano’s school.
During this 60-year period (1830–1890), scientific research imposed a substantial change
on the European cultural matrix, placing before philosophers a list of numerous problems0315-0860/$ - see front matter  2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.hm.2010.05.004
E-mail address: l.ingaliso@unict.it
1 I thank Elena Anne Marchisotto for helping and encouraging me.
Mario Pieri’s address at the University of Catania 233to resolve, from the classification of sciences (for example, the system of Auguste Comte) to
the epistemological value of the single disciplines (mathematics included). Since mathe-
matics was considered a scientia universalis (a universal science), it became associated,
within the framework of the systematization of Newtonian physics, with the development
of technology that took place during the first industrial revolution.
The theoretical elaborations on the foundations of mathematics regained vigor from the
middle of the 19th century, thanks to the contributions of the scholars of French school, par-
ticularly those of Augustin-Louis Cauchy, and due to the creation of non-Euclidean geom-
etries. This new vigor gave rise to a debate on the foundations of geometry which began in
1821 and which engaged the most prominent mathematicians of the time [Bottazzini, 1990,
83–102].
This new research on foundations, especially in geometry, created a paradox. On the one
hand, it provided an increase in the mathematical fields of knowledge. On the other, it
spelled the end of the optimism rooted in Comte’s positivistic philosophy, by introducing
a concept of evolution in scientific thinking that went beyond the positivistic stance. Mario
Pieri2 described this new concept in the Discorso3 (Address) that he gave for the opening of
the academic year 1906–1907 at the University of Catania. Pieri stated that such evolution
in scientific thinking was possible through the implementation of formal or logistic phase in
which it is possible to “observe how the sciences gradually evolve from being the doctrine of
the real to being the doctrine of the possible” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 414].4 Onto these reflec-
tions were grafted the contributions of the Darwinian theory of evolution and those of psy-
chological research, as well as contributions of classical mechanics, which began to perceive
the limits of the Newtonian model [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 415].
In recent years, the evaluation of this intellectual dynamics has determined the historio-
graphic conviction that the kind of positivism employed by scientists was not, as a whole, a
homogeneous phenomenon. As a consequence, it could not be understood, as partly hap-2 Mario Pieri was born in Lucca (Tuscany) where he attended elementary and technical school. He
then went to Bologna where he attended the Regio Istituto Tecnico (Royal Technical Institute). In
the academic year 1880–1881, Pieri matriculated at the University of Bologna. In November 1881, he
was accepted at the Scuola Reale Normale Superiore (Royal Superior Normal School) of Pisa. At
Pisa, he studied under several important professors including De Paolis, Dini, and Bianchi. In June
1884, he was awarded a doctorate in mathematics from the University of Pisa. He spent a short
period in the technical school in Pisa, and then he started to teach projective and descriptive
geometry at the Regia Accademia Militare (Royal Military Academy) in Turin. Subsequently, he
taught at the University of Turin (1891), where he remained until 1900. He then moved to the
University of Catania, where he was appointed as professor of projective and descriptive geometry
and of higher geometry. He remained at the University of Catania until 1908, when he moved to the
University of Parma. In 1912, he applied for medical leave because of a serious illness that would
lead to his death in March 1913 [Levi, 1913, 65–74; Brigaglia and Masotto, 1982, 135–136; Arrighi,
1997, 39–40, 56, 102; Arrighi, 1981; Tazzioli, 1999, 207–224; Marchisotto and Smith, 2007, 32–44].
3 Pieri sent a copy of his Discorso to many colleagues, including Peano. The annual opening
address was given in turn by illustrious members of the various faculties following a plan of annual
rotation. This practice was in use in all Italian universities. For example, Volterra delivered an
address Sui tentativi di applicazione delle matematiche alle scienze biologiche e sociali (On the
Attempts to Apply Mathematics to Biological and Social Sciences) at the University of Rome in
1901 [Arrighi, 1997, 91, 106, 123; Dollo et al., 2000, 558–605; Guerraggio and Nastasi, 1993, 32–33].
4 “[le scienze] si vedono infatti trasformare sé stesse man mano dalla condizione di dottrine del
reale in quella di dottrine del possibile” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 414].
234 L. Ingalisopened in Italy at the end of the 19th century [Santucci, 1996, 7–8], according to a dichoto-
mous model. In fact, such an interpretative scheme, based upon the division between meth-
odological and metaphysical positivism, risks becoming a criterion of admissibility (that
obviously excludes the philosophical and psychological aspects of the sciences, which were
the keystone of positivistic scientific thinkers), rather than a real attempt to understand the
epistemological complexity of these thinkers. In the rejection of this dichotomous model,
Pieri finds the possibility of a mathematical psychology founded on the relationships or
properties that exist among the parts.5 “Q
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connEvery subject can be mathematically studied when it shows some irrefutable and precise
data from which some consequences can be derived by pure reason. The fact that those
data permit themselves to be evaluated, elaborated and shaped quantitatively, rather than
qualitatively (so that they can be measured), although seen as a favorable circumstance, is
deemed not necessary in order for a theory to acquire a mathematical status. Just for the
sake of an example, let us presuppose that psychologists would not be able to provide
precise measurements about feelings, volitions and other data which come under their
competence: this would not mean that the possibility of a mathematics of psychology
would be excluded [. . .]. For example, the mathematical element could just consist in
the fact that the same property is not usually found in isolation, but it is found to be pres-
ent simultaneously in a lot of data and in different propositions through which it con-
nects itself with other properties. Therefore, the deductive logical process will be
sufficient in order to recognize in these other properties the existence of new links and
new connections. [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 408–409].5The study of the context of late Italian positivism, the one that Pieri advocated, has
found new life in the last 30 years in the consolidation of studies in the history of science,
and in a renewed unity between historians and philosophers of science. The latter has found
concrete expression in Gianni Micheli’s book [Micheli, 1980].
This research has shown that the geopolitical fragmentation of Italy in the first half of
the 19th century, unlike the unity of the great European nations, did not support a homo-
geneous development of national scientific knowledge. However, there were some interest-
ing attempts, as in the case of mathematics, to unite these fragmentations. One of these
attempts was the publication of the Memorie (Memoirs) of the Società Italiana delle Scienze
(Italian Society of Sciences), known as the Società dei XL (Society of the XL), which was
founded in the second half of the 18th century.
In this context, we should consider the enthusiastic response of the Italians in October
1839 to the news that in Germany a group of scientists had organized some regular gath-ualunque soggetto divien capace di trattamento matematico, non appena si scorgono in esso
erti e precisi, onde possan ritrarsi conseguenze per via di puro raziocinio. Che quei dati si
ino ad esser valutati, elaborati e plasmati in modo quantitativo, anziché qualitativo (così da
vi introdurre la misura) è circostanza bensì favorevole, ma non propriamente necessaria perché
ottrina acquisti carattere matematico: di guisa che per es., quando anche gli psicologi non
ssero a fornirci esatte misure in ordine alle sensazioni, volizioni ed altri fatti di lor competenza,
sarebbe esclusa per questo la possibilità d’una psicologia matematica [. . .]. L’elemento
matico potrà consistere, ad es., nel solo fatto che la medesima proprietà non si offra per solito
isolata da tutto il resto, ma figuri ad un tempo in parecchi dati e in diverse proposizioni, per
o delle quali essa venga a connettersi con altre proprietà: basta allora il solo processo logico
deduzione per riconoscere in queste altre proprietà l’esistenza di nuovi legami e nuove
essioni” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 408–409].
Mario Pieri’s address at the University of Catania 235erings in order to discuss a list of current scientific questions. Later the same year the first
congress of the Italian scientists, analogous to the German model, was organized in Pisa.6
These congresses positively marked the path of Italian science for almost 70 years. As a
matter of fact, by reaffirming the need for a collaboration among the various scientific dis-
ciplines (particularly through the creation of new journals [Bottazzini, 1983, 37], as had
been done in the philosophical environment), these meetings helped to overcome the frag-
mentation of research [Tabarroni, 1983, 173–174].
As to the development of mathematics in Italy in the second half of the 19th century and at the
beginning of the 20th, some researchers have tied, albeit in different ways, the rebirth of mathe-
matical studies to the ideas and events which led to the national unity. Others have placed the
revival in the 18th century [Giusti and Pepe, 2001, 7–69; Galuzzi, 1980, 1004–1008]. The decel-
eration of mathematical research after the Congress of Vienna (1815) was followed by a
restart in the 1840s and 1850s. This restart was intensified by the process of the national uni-
fication of Italy, thanks to the institution of new university chairs. All of this allowed for a
growth of mathematical studies that culminated, in response to Vito Volterra’s proposal, in
the designation of Rome as the host city in 1908 for the International Congress of Mathema-
ticians (after Paris in 19007 and Heidelberg in 1904). The congress was organized by illustrious
scholars of the international mathematical world, the Accademia dei Lincei (Academy of
Lincei) and the Circolo Matematico (Mathematical Circle) of Palermo. The Circle had 924
members, 618 of whom were foreigners, but later it was excluded from the International Con-
gress of Mathematicians due to various conflicts within the Italian mathematical community
[Guerraggio and Nastasi, 2008; Brigaglia and Masotto, 1982, 235–250].
The transformations of the institutional framework surrounding the teaching of mathe-
matics in Italy were followed by a discussion on subjects of international relevance. Schol-
ars tried to supersede the limits of Comte’s definition of mathematics as a simple study of
numbers and figures as well as John Stuart Mill’s empiricist approach, which was concerned
with the reduction of mathematical bodies to specific physical realities and which had been
criticized by Gottlob Frege. So, at the end of the 19th century, there was, according to Pieri
[Pieri 1907 (1980), 392], a new unity between mathematics and philosophy. Both disciplines
wanted to develop a rigorous deductive logic of the concept of number, whose definition
was totally freed from concrete reality. According to Pieri, the recourse to a mathematical
logic (or symbolic logic or algorithmic logic or logistic), which represented an improvement
of Aristotelian deductive logic,8 and to the idea of calculus ratiocinator, had its historical6 During the period of its activity, the Società Italiana delle Scienze organized 12 congresses, 9 from
1839 to 1847, then one in 1862, one in 1873, and the last one in 1875 [Pancaldi, 1983].
7 Pieri was invited to speak at Paris in 1900. Although he did not go, Louis Couturat read his
address – one that pertains not only to the foundations of geometry but also to logic and the
philosophy of science [Pieri, 1900 (1980), 235–272].
8 Peano’s influences are evident here. On several occasions he had emphasized, in the wake of the
Aristotelian tradition, that a definition proceeds from the known to the unknown. According to
Pieri, the limit of Aristotle’s logic was the fact that it was restricted to the study of the relations of
inclusion and predication between general and abstract concepts. Over the centuries, mathematics,
too, had developed its own deductive method, its own logic independent from classical logic, thus
giving rise to a dualism that philosophers resolved in the distinction between quality logic
(mathematics) and quantity logic (classical or syllogistic). This dichotomy began to be overcome
only in the second half of the 19th century with the publication of the works of Cauchy, Abel, von
Staudt, Weierstrass, Kronecker, and Cantor, which contributed to the creation of the new vision of
mathematical sciences as hypothetico-deductive systems [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 402–403].
236 L. Ingalisofoundation in the work of Leibniz [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 405]. However, mathematical logic
had achieved its apex thanks to Peano’s logic of relations and his introduction of the log-
ico-mathematical symbolism [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 393–394], which gave rise to a “positivism
of deductive reason” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 399].9
Only from this perspective is it possible to understand the research of Peano’s early stud-
ies on logic with the objective of publishing them in the Formulaire de mathématiques (For-
mulation of Mathematics). In the Formulaire, Peano and other members of his School
expressed fundamental theorems of mathematics in a symbolic language that Peano had
developed. It was published for the first time in 1895, followed by three more editions in
French — 1899, 1901, and 1903 — and by a fifth publication compiled in 1908 in Latino
sine flexione (Latin without inflections).10 The fundamental assumption of this publication
was that in mathematics the context of formal rigor precedes the context of the discovery
itself as well as the context of demonstration.11 Peano had already announced the objective
of logic in 1889 in Arithmetices principia nova methodo exposita (the principles of arithmetic,
presented by a new method) and in I principii di geometria logicamente esposti (the princi-
ples of geometry logically exposed), both of which had introductions dedicated to logic.12
He, and Pieri as well, maintained that logic has the objective of freeing mathematics from
the ambiguities of the common language. Bertrand Russell, after he had met Peano at the
International Congress of Philosophy in Paris in 1900, observed that his colleague envi-
sioned logic as an artificial language able to express concepts and mathematical proofs
in a rigorous way.13 In this way, logic becomes an instrumentum ordinis (an instrument
of order), capable of denoting with symbols ideas omnes quae in arithmeticae principiis
occurrunt (all the ideas that occur in mathematical principles).
According to Pieri, Peano’s new definition of logic could address many of the difficulties
met by Frege in his Begriffsschrift (concept notation) (1879). However, Peano was able to9 “positivismo della ragione deduttiva” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 399].
10 Latin without inflections, later called Interlingua, was an important project of Peano. The idea
was to use the Latin vocabulary in a new way: simplify the grammar and remove all irregular
anomalous forms. The results in a change to a positional language.
11 This assumption led to a famous controversy between Peano and Corrado Segre, publicized in the
Rivista di matematica, a mathematical review founded by Peano in 1891. In that year, in an article on
some research in algebraic geometry, Segre wrote, “it is definitely better to leave to science maximum
freedom. In particular, . . . when the question is just to find out a truth, the pureness of the method
becomes of minor interest, so it often happens that on the first approach to a question one has to
sacrifice . . . rigor” [Segre, 1891, 45, 53]. In response to Segre’s article, Peano wrote, “in my opinion,
the lack of rigor in mathematical works cannot be accepted, defended or excused” [Peano, 1891, 66].
12 The turning point in Peano’s vision occurred with a reversal in his use of logical tools. In fact,
from applying algebraic techniques to logic he proceeded to applying logic to mathematics. The first
signs of this use of logic are to be found in the introduction to Calcolo geometrico secondo
l’Ausdehnungslehre di H. Grassmann, preceduto dalle operazioni della logica deduttiva (Geometrical
Calculus According to H. Grassmann’s Ausdehnungslehre (Theory of Extension), Preceded by the
Operations of Deductive Logic) (1888) [Borga, 1985, 17–23].
13 The results of the new mathematical logic were welcomed with great enthusiasm, although there
were some detractors whose attitude Pieri compared to that of Caliph Omar when he decided to
destroy the Library of Alexandria. Particularly caustic was the criticism expressed by Benedetto
Croce in his Lineamenti d’una Logica, come scienza del concetto puro (Outlines of a Logic, as Science
of Pure Concept) (1905). Pieri reported the criticism of Croce in his Discorso and tried to question it,
but his reasons were rather weak [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 400–402].
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bolically organized compendium of the most important mathematical theories, but also
because “he identified as primary bodies the notion of class or aggregate, the membership
relation (which connects the subject and the attribute of a simple proposition, and which
the Scholastics had already separated from the relation of inclusion by distinguishing
between sensus compositi and sensus divisi of the verb ‘to be’) and its inverse, the notion
of function or representation, the indexes to the sign of deduction, the conventions on the
parentheses and the variable letters, etc.” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 397–398].14
The logistic or formal phase of mathematics supercedes both the positive and the deduc-
tive phases (in the traditional sense) of the physical sciences [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 410]. In
other words, in mathematics the form prevails over the substance. Pieri believed that
although the two disciplines, arithmetic and geometry, have distinct objects of study, the
number (what can be counted) and the image (what can be represented) respectively, “they
can both be conceived as a formal study of a certain order of logical relations” [Pieri, 1907
(1980), 411].15 Pieri does not deny applications of the sciences in our world, but we should
not confuse these applications with the science itself. Take, for example, the case of geom-
etry: it is beyond doubt that the geometrical body known as extension has played an extre-
mely important heuristic role through the centuries. “However, it is not Geometry, just as
Accounting is not Arithmetics” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 414].16
Thus Pieri recognized the significance of the bond between mathematics and the
unchangeable laws of logic. He noted that “The progressive merging of Logic with Mathe-
matics — the kind of merging attained implicitly and unconsciously in the works of Boole,
Schröder and C. Peirce on one side, and in those of Weierstrass, Cantor and Peano on the
other side — is an event of great importance for the philosophy of mathematics” [Pieri,
1907 (1980), 435].17
The affirmation of the possible over the real, which is the distinctive element of the new
epistemological status of the sciences, in particular the mathematical sciences, paves the
way to nominalism. However, there are also risks associated with this view. A clarification
is in order here. Pieri distinguished between two types of nominalism: a naive nominalism,
and a mature nominalism. The first, in which symbols are chosen arbitrarily, became the14 “pose in ufficio di enti primitivi la nozione di classe o oggregato, la relazione di appartenere (che
intercede fra il soggetto e l’attributo d’una proposizione semplice, e che già gli scolastici aveano
separata da quella d’inclusione, distinguendo il sensus compositi e il sensu divisi, del verbo essere) con
la sua inversa, l’idea di funzione o rappresentazione, gl’indici al segno di deduzione, le convenzioni
circa le parentesi e le lettere variabili, ecc.” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 397–398].
15 “non è tolta per questo la facoltà di concepir l’una e l’altra come studio formale d’un certo ordine
di relazioni logiche” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 411]. Pierce and others drew the primary geometrical
concepts from ordinary spatial intuition as they believed that geometry was a subclass of applied
mathematics. According to Pieri, they were wrong. Pieri’s epistemological paradigm clearly shows
the foundational crisis the geometric-mathematical model had gone through during the second half
of the nineteenth century. It is not by accident that Federigo Enriques, discussing the real meaning
of geometry, wrote, “It seems that geometry should be given a place of honor in the field of
philosophical studies!” [Enriques, 1906, 151].
16 “Ma esso non è la Geometria, come la Contabilità non è l’Aritmetica” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 414].
17 “La fusione progressiva della Logica con la Matematica — che si compieva implicitamente, e
quasi inconsciamente nei lavori di Boole, Schröder e C. Peirce da un lato, e di Weierstrass, Cantor e
Peano dall’altro — costituisce senza alcun dubbio un fatto di somma importanza per la filosofia
delle matematiche” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 435].
238 L. Ingalisoobject of Hobbes’s criticism. The second recognizes on the one hand the freedom of the
mathematician to create his own concepts (in line with Cantor’s thought), and on the other
hand permits him or her to give to those concepts a real content (so that the mathematician
does not have to become overly concerned whether, at the moment in which he operates,
the concepts are actually confirmed by facts) [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 418]. In Pieri’s view, a
mathematician’s freedom is a “conditioned” freedom, its function being to ward off every
possible fantastic implication in his research and at the same time to promote new discov-
eries, as the birth of the calculus of probability well demonstrates [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 417].
All this is possible “perhaps thanks to that harmony, which allows (according to
B. Spinoza) the operations of our intellect to be a priori in tune with the phenomena of
the universe” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 417].18
The postulate of the existential possibility of mathematical objects represents the discri-
men between the visions of Pieri and Russell. Pieri did praise Russell for having recognized
the oneness of the deductive, logical and mathematical method and for having summarized
all the mathematical relations to 9 logical constants and 12 indemonstrable propositions
[Russell, 1903]. However, he noted the lack of an existential postulate in Russell’s argumen-
tative structure. Such a postulate, typically found in all mathematical systems, allows,
unlike what would happen in pure logic, the creation of any new existence theorem. Pieri
contended that in a mathematical system an existence theorem is needed because the simple
expression of mathematical entities through a logico-symbolic relation is not sufficient by
itself to guarantee their existence.18 “in
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lawsHence it follows, for instance, that the demonstration given to prove the existence of an
integer is not (in my opinion) conclusive; in fact here, as always, the attempts made to
confirm such an existence in a field that excludes every existential principle have failed
[Pieri, 1907 (1980), 437].19Closely connected to the problem of freedom to choose concepts in constructing mathe-
matical theory is the problem of the necessity of logico-mathematical deductions. Many
mathematicians, such as Maxime Bôcher, based this necessity on the historical analysis
of these deductions and on the use that had been made of them over the centuries [Pieri,
1907 (1980), 420]. The acceptance of such an assumption would have as a direct conse-
quence the loss of the necessity principle pertaining to logical axioms. They would then
be reduced to simple tools whose validity would be strictly bound to diachronic develop-
ment. It is not by accident that the promoters of such an approach believe that some argu-grazia forse di quella certa armonia, che (secondo B. Spinoza) fa sì che le operazioni del
o intelletto siano a priori intonate coi fenomeni dell’universo” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 417].
i qui nasce, ad es., che la dimostrazione recata a provar l’esistenza del numero intero non è (a
mio) concludente: anzi qui, come sempre, fallirono i mezzi tentati per confermare
esistenza in un dominio che escluda qualunque principio esistenziale” [Pieri, 1907 (1980),
The new mathematical logic recognizes in the Galilean world of paper the same epistemological
as that of the sensitive world: “The world of human ideas and imaginations is neither less real,
ess worthy of study and diligent observation than the other world, to whose investigation he
alilei] successfully directed the activity of his mind. Opinions, whether they are true or false,
till facts, and as such they deserve and require to be taken as the object of investigation,
cation, comparison, interpretation, explanation, just like any other kind of facts, and with the
purpose; that is to say, with the purpose to ascertain, as far as it is possible, in the middle of
varieties, complexities, transformations, the constant elements, the uniformities, in short the
by which their succession is regulated” [Vailati, 1911, 65].
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fact, those who embrace such a view, according to Pieri, do not distinguish between the
truth of logical principles, to which also mathematics adheres and which is not subject to
contradiction, and the use that was made of these same principles through history. The
acceptance of such a distinction explains why in mathematical knowledge subsequent dis-
coveries do not invalidate ones that precede them. However, it cannot be excluded a priori
that some axioms in the future may see less use in their field of application. Having said this,
one does not want to challenge the degree of necessity by which axioms function in their
field of operation. [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 421].20 “U
esclu
sgrad
21 “n
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da og
dimo
dimo
[PieriSuch a doubt cannot be logically challenged; because, unfortunately, one does not have
any tool whereby to exclude a priori (that is with the same certainty of a logical theorem)
the possibility of such an unpleasant event [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 421–422].20Pieri’s claim can be easily demonstrated with reasoning that emerges from the well-
known Third Man Argument. Indeed,One cannot have an apodictic certainty on the compatibility or consistency of all the pre-
mises put together, which are inherent to the discussion; in fact, to conclude that logical
axioms A, B, C, . . . are immune from any cause of contradiction, one needs to be certain
that principles A0, B0, C0, . . . on which the demonstration is based, are compatible. This, in
its turn, requires a new demonstration, and so on without hope of exit, like a dog that
chases its tail. [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 422].21This vicious circle finds further confirmation in the antinomies that have characterized
the development of logic since its origins, from those proposed by Zeno of Elea to the more
recent that are concerned with the transfinite numbers. Yet if, on the one hand, Pieri con-
demned the historicization of logical elements, on the other hand, he used the history of
science to show how many antinomies of the past, not only have been resolved in modern
times [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 423] but also refer directly or indirectly to the concept of infinity.
According to Pieri, Russell succeeded in explaining the various antinomies typical of
contemporary logic by substituting the notion of class or aggregate with the notion of rela-
tion [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 423–425]. The historical and the inductive development of logic pro-
vide the only methodology able to show that the ultimate principles of reason converge and
do not contradict each other. Logistic formalism, therefore, is not interested in the nature of
datum. It focuses its attention only on the existing relations among the bodies by trans-
forming them into symbolic expressions until they can be decomposed no further. The
resulting indecomposable expressions, as Russell had already stated, can only be accessed
through an empirical process, that is to say, through usage [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 431].
The formal structure of the new mathematical logic can lead to a further objection about
the possibility of its becoming a simple exercise of speculative reason or, worse still, a bar-n tal dubbio non è logicamente impugnabile; non avendosi pur troppo alcun mezzo di
dere a priori (ossia con la stessa certezza di un teorema logico) la possibilità d’un evento così
evole” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 421–422].
on si può avere una certezza apodittica della compatibilità o consistenza di tutte insieme le
esse inerenti al discorso; in quanto per concluder che gli assiomi logici A, B, C,. . . sono immuni
ni germe di contradizione, bisogna esser certi che i principi A0, B0, C0,. . . su cui poggia la
strazione sono essi stessi compatibili: la qual cosa richiede a sua volta una nuova
strazione; e così via senza speranza di uscita, come il cane che insegue la propria coda”
, 1907 (1980), 422].
240 L. Ingalisoren tautology, which in fact would contradict the fruitful results that mathematics achieved
between the 18th and 19th centuries, as is evident in Peano’s Formulaire. The mistake in
such a methodological approach is rooted, according to Pieri, in its reductionistic vision
of logic, which, on the one hand, bases itself only on the application of the principles of
identity, noncontradiction, and the excluded middle, and on the other hand, bases itself
on the mere recognition of the pedagogic-didactic value of its argumentations, “where,
on the other side, the discovery of new truths would always be the result of extra-logical
operations that develop themselves in the mysterious and dark depths of intuition!” [Pieri,
1907 (1980), 442–443].22 Actually, in logic the whole deductive phenomenon seems to be
more important than the single associative principle, since its proprium (peculiarity) consists
in the possibility of identifying elements that cannot be derived analytically from the single
logical principle intervening in the deductive process and, therefore, these elements are
entirely new. Thus, on a par with induction, logical deduction generally increases the con-
tent of our knowledge:22 “d
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by inThen therefore, will one have to say that combinatorial analysis is a synthetic method?
Let it be said, and we won’t mince words, as long as they mean purely logical and intel-
lectual syntheses that have nothing to do with sensible intuition. And even though one
would like to sustain such syntheses with some intuition, let it be a rational intuition, that
is to say, an apperception of logical relationships between principles and consequences,
and nothing else. [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 443–444]23In mathematical logic, this fruitfulness of results is guaranteed both by the use of aux-
iliary elements, which is a peculiarity of mathematical reasoning, and by the nature of its
relations, which have a high degree of combination.24 In such a system, the role of intuition
is decidedly bound to the genius theme, that is to say, it has the capability to gather ele-
ments that will become truth after they have been proven through the tools of discursive
logic. Indeed, this is the only concession that Pieri granted to intuition. It is on the basis
of this claim and of Couturat’s research [Couturat, 1906, 339] that Pieri proposed to recon-
cile heuristics and dialectics. To that end he introduced a distinction between the static and
the dynamic aspects of a discipline. The purpose of logistics is the creation of stable truths,
so it is inclined more to the static aspect, while the activity of the genius operates in the bor-ove, per contro l’acquisto di nuovi veri sarebbe sempre l’effetto di operazioni extralogiche,
entisi nelle profondità misteriose ed oscure dell’intuizione!” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 442–443].
i dovrà perciò dire che quella Combinatoria è un metodo sintetico? Dicasi, e non faremo
ioni di parole; purchè s’intendano sintesi puramente logiche e intellettuali, che nulla ripetano
ntuizione sensibile; e quando pur si voglia dar loro a sostegno una qualche intuizione, sia
a un’intuizione razionale, vale a dire una apercezione di rapporti logici tra principi e
guenze, e null’altro” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 443–444].
ri “was, therefore, far from denying the reasonableness of trascendentality, but he could not
op it in the direction taken by neoidealism, which implied other choices and requirements,
ely those identified in the search for the universal ” [Dollo, 2005, 344]. The results of this research
vident in the acquisitions of the new logic, which on the one hand has contributed to the
fication of a series of different propositions, peculiar to classical logic (affirmative/negative,
al/particular, categorical/hypothetical, etc.), in “one only and fundamental distinction between
sitions affirming the mutual dependence of two or more facts and ‘existential’ propositions
ing the possibility that two or more facts come true at the same time” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 433]; on
her hand, it has widened the classical theory of definition (tied up to kind and specific difference)
troducing the possibility of defining a class as a function of other already known classes.
Mario Pieri’s address at the University of Catania 241der zone between positive reason and the other spheres of knowledge, so it is inclined more
to the dynamic aspect, that is to say, the free search for scientific knowledge25 [Pieri, 1907
(1980), 446–447].
These premises form the necessary base on which to lay the pars costruens (building part)
of the new hypothetic-deductive norm (categorical or disjunctive) of sciences [Pieri, 1907
(1980), 432]. The logico-mathematical formalism goes along with the concept of truth,
now defined as that particular domain where hypotheses (or conditions) that have been laid
as foundations of a particular theorem prove to be true. Therefore, one could say that the
formal value of mathematical truths is found in the concept of hypothetical necessity.26
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possilogico-mathematical studies on the various deductive disciplines do try to highlight this
characteristic and discover it where it is not evident, by organizing each discipline (inas-
much as it is possible) according to one or more hypothetic-deductive systems [Pieri, 1907
(1980), 425].27Therefore, the logistic organization of a deductive system can be defined as a process of
reduction that operates on two levels, primarily through the identification and definition of
primary ideas (axioms or postulates), and secondarily through the deductive reduction
of its propositions (or theorems) to primary ideas [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 427]. Unlike what
intuitionists claim, the choice of primary propositions takes place, not based on the crite-
rion of greater or lesser evidence, but according to the objectives that one wants to reach.
Giovanni Vailati, who served, like Pieri, as an assistant to Peano, explained the relation
between axioms and the propositions that were derived from them, using a metaphor about
two systems of government. In the past, the link between axioms and their derived propo-
sitions was similar to the link that existed between a king and his subjects. In the present,
axioms renounce their divine right and are comparable to elected leaders whose selection
depends on how useful they are to their society [Vailati, 1977, 48–49]. This is true not only
for mathematics but also for every other deductive science, in particular for geometry, in
which, as Pasch had already declared, argumentation schemes are independent of the mean-
ing of geometric bodies and of their cross-reference to an illustrative figure as well. This
reveals the close link between Pieri’s formalism and the birth of non-Euclidean geometries
[Pieri, 1907 (1980), 428; Pasch, 1882]. Alongside the criterion of the useful, there are otherr’s approach is distant from that of the intuionists. Although the intuitionists do not question
alidity of the axiomatic method, they introduce in the construction of a mathematical system a
r, obtained through intuition, which cannot be traced back to any logical form. For example,
ecker maintained that the series of natural numbers derived from an original intuition that has
given to us by God, while the rest of the mathematical construction has been made by man.
more unusual seems the theory expressed by Brouwer in his doctoral thesis, Over de
slagen der wiskunde (On the foundations of mathematics). Here, Poincaré’s constructivism is
ht to its extreme consequences. Although Brouwer recognized the Kantian origin of
ionism, he kept aloof from the philosopher of Königsberg. In fact, he admitted the apriority of
but denied the apriority of space [Bottazzini, 1990, 401–402].
ri cited the concept of hypothetical necessity from a work of Couturat, published in Paris in
[Pieri, 1907 (1980), 425]. However, he did not agree on the essentially analytical characteristic
urat attributed to mathematical opinions [Couturat, 1905, 4, 235].
li studi logico-matematici intorno alle varie discipline deduttive cercano appunto di dar risalto
sto carattere e di scoprirlo dove non è palese, organizzando ciascuna di quelle (fin dove è
bile) secondo uno o più sistemi ipotetico-deduttivi” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 425].
242 L. Ingalisoequally important criteria whose purpose is to give cohesion and stability to the system. The
first criterion is the criterion of compatibility of the axioms, according to which the theo-
rems produced by primary propositions cannot be in contradiction. The second is the cri-
terion of completeness, which establishes that all the propositions of the system have to be
deduced from the axioms. Finally, the third is the criterion of independence, according to
which none of the primary propositions can be deduced from the other ones.
Thus far I have described the framework that highlights and demonstrates, in Pieri’s
epistemology, the primacy of speculative reason over practical reason. As Kant would
put it, it is the task of the critique of reason to justify the primary propositions used by
mathematical logic. However, it seems certain that the analytic circumscription of the same
primary propositions should be reserved to logic:28 “L
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of infTherefore, in our opinion, formal Logic will be the necessary preface, the propaedeutics
of every truly scientific and critical philosophy [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 448].28In his reflections on logic, Pieri endeavored to overcome the ancient dichotomy between
those who saw logic as the study of precise thinking and those who defined it as the study of
relations external to the individual. From a philosophical perspective, these affirmations
reveal the limits of Pieri’s contribution, since he is not a philosopher. However, unlike
his mentor Peano, Pieri considered logic an essential part of mathematics (and therefore
functional in it) and also the right premise for every deductive science [Jourdain, 1912, 213].
In Pieri’s rigoristic perspective, the formalism of hypothetico-deductive sciences becomes
one with modern axiomatics, in which primary concepts are implicitly defined by axioms.29
This approach is unlike classical or Euclidean axiomatics, whose system is essentially con-
tent-centered and bases itself on the evidence and veracity of primary propositions. In the
Euclidean view, these characteristics of primary propositions, in their turn, are transmitted
to the derived propositions through the definition of evidence and the demonstration of
veracity. Pieri’s perspective is further aligned with modern axiomatics, where the syntactic,
formal problem becomes primary over the semantic, content-centered problem. The
research on the semantic, content-centered problem coincides, indeed, with the search for
an interpretation that verifies the totality of the founding propositions of the system.
By “renouncing” the search for the absolute truth, the formalism of the new axiomatics
turns out to be a descendent of the crisis of classical geometry. It is not by chance that the
prototype of such a system coincides with the opinion of Hilbert, author of one of the most
important works on modern axiomatics, the Grundlagen der Geometrie (Foundations of
Geometry) (1899), about the primary concepts: “Man muss jederzeit an Stelle von Punkte,
Geraden, Ebenen, ‘Tische, Stühle, Bierseidel’ sagen können” (it has to be possible to say ata Logica formale sarà dunque per noi la necessaria prefazione, la propedeutica d’ogni filosofia
ente scientifica e critica” [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 448].
he axiomatic method turns intuitive logic into a formalized theory of the so-called logical
ectives, such as implication, negation, etc., and replaces the intuitive metalinguistic concept of
l consequence with that formal concept of implication of the object language . . . . From a
rical viewpoint, [it] is the first method to satisfy the formalistic claim to objectify and formalize
ntuitive and informal reasoning . . . . Furthermore, it does not furnish any prescriptions,
ives or suggestions on how particular demonstrations should be conducted. And it does not
furnish any instructions on how to refute propositions that are not logical theorems. An
atic system is the smallest set of formulas of a certain language, which is closed under its rules
erence” [Surma, 1981, 123–124].
Mario Pieri’s address at the University of Catania 243all times ‘tables, chairs, beermugs’ instead of points, straight lines, planes) [Hilbert, 1935,
III, 403]. Thus, the ontological problem becomes of secondary importance since there is
not an a priori single representation of space or of time, but only a possible representation
of them, which does not dismiss but rather favors the creation of further interpretations of
the meaning of these two concepts.
This exposition, which has been barely traced here, does not do justice to the role that the
school of Peano played in the construction of modern axiomatics, even though it had a
widespread influence in historiographic circles. Indeed, Marco Borga states that, if one
wanted to make the birth of the new formalism coincide with the notion of the hypotheti-
co-deductive system or with the conception of axioms as implicit definitions, then one
would be certain that these ideas were already present in Peano [Peano, 1957–1959, III,
119] and, above all, in Pieri [Borga, 1985, 51–56]. The latter not only distances himself from
his mentor Peano in regard to the empirical origin of the primary concepts of geometry,
confirming their abstract origin [Pieri, 1896 (1980), 84], but also provides one of the most
precise definitions of how to understand primary concepts in the frame of a hypothetico-
deductive system:30 “C
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primiThe first and foremost characteristic of the primary bodies of any hypothetico-deductive
system whatsoever is that they can be interpreted arbitrarily, within certain boundaries
assigned by primary propositions (axioms or postulates). In other words, the ideal content
of the words or signs that denote some primary subject is only determined by the primary
propositions that rotate around it. The Reader is free to give to those words or signs any
meaning of his choice, provided such a meaning is compatible with the generic attributes
that primary propositions have imposed on this body. [Pieri, 1897–1898 (1980), 106]30Yet one cannot limit the new axiomatic method just to these premises without running
into the historical error of excluding some of its most important characteristics, which were
extensively presented by Hilbert in his work and in the Italian contribution to the new axi-
omatics. At the same time, a correct reconstruction should try to explain the reasons that
led to the hegemony of Hilbert’s method and to the quick decline of the Italian school, by
primarily recognizing a difference between the goals of the two schools. While the school of
Peano had as its aim the attainment of a “pure” and rigorous axiomatics, Hilbert’s school
wanted to replace the genetic method for the creation of new mathematical bodies with the
axiomatic method [Borga, 1985, 51 and 56; Galuzzi, 1980, 1102–1105]. Pieri’s mathematical
research certainly moved from Peano’s studies, where all the problems of justification (from
those of Euclid to those proposed by Kant) are solved in a rigoristic framework.
In his memoir entitled Sur la Géométrie envisagée comme un système purement logique
(On Geometry Envisaged as a Purely Logical System) (1900), Pieri explained how a geom-
etry can be constructed as a hypothetico-deductive system. The view of geometry as an
abstract system had its roots in the 17th century, starting with Descartes. With his algebra-
ization of geometry, geometrical thought began to depart from the use of intuition and thearattere principalissimo degli enti primitivi d’un qualsivoglia sistema ipotetico-deduttivo è
r questi capaci d’interpretazioni arbitrarie, dentro certi confini assegnati dalle proposizioni
tive (assiomi o postulati). In altri termini il contenuto ideale delle parole o dei segni, che
ano un qualche soggetto primitivo, è determinato soltanto dalle prop.i primit.e che versano
no al medesimo: e il Lettore ha facoltà di annettere a quelle parole a que’ segni un significato ad
m, purchè questo sia compatibile con gli attributi generici imposti a quell’ente dalle propos.i
t.e” [Pieri, 1897–1898 (1980), 106].
244 L. IngalisoEuclidean vision, going the way of abstraction. Later, non-Euclidean geometries confirmed
that different geometrical systems could coexist, thus challenging Kant’s idea of space
understood as an a priori form of the human spirit and the idea of geometry as the science
of extension. In conclusion, what counts in a deductive system is that it guarantees the inde-
pendence of the relations from the meaning of geometrical concepts [Pieri, 1900 (1980),
238–242].
According to Pieri, a hypothetico-deductive system is based on a priori or primary judg-
ments and on inceptive ideas, which classify the notions on which these judgments are
based. The former are further distinguished into primary subjects or categories (irreducible
among them) and primary propositions or postulates (ideally independent from one
another). Primary ideas then give rise to the derivative or complex ideas, which, on the
one hand, allow us to establish the logical equivalence of two systems and, on the other
hand, allow us, through the use of categories and a specific method, to work on expressions
with variable content, even though they are linked by known relations. Moving from two
primary ideas (point and motion) Pieri demonstrated that it is possible to construct a
hypothetico-deductive system of elementary geometry [Pieri, 1900 (1980), 259–272]. Never-
theless, the issue concerning the selection of these primary ideas remains arbitrary.
Pieri’s idea is ultimately that the primitive ideas can be chosen arbitrarily and then later
“verified” by assigning meanings to them derived from our world. But in the construction
of geometry, the primary concepts are abstract entities that serve as roots of logical equa-
tions. Pieri asserts that primary concepts can be given as the roots of a certain system of
logical equations following the criterion that every science is normally characterized by a
maximum group of transformations that do not have the power to alter the proprieties stud-
ied by this science (the idea of transformation group refers to Pieri’s embrace of Felix
Klein’s definition of geometry) [Pieri, 1900 (1980), 238–242].
Although Pieri’s research spanned a variety of areas (differential and algebraic geometry,
vector analysis, foundations of arithmetic and geometry, logic and the philosophy of sci-
ence), his best-known research remains tied to studies in foundations of geometry (partic-
ularly projective geometry). The works of Gauss (on the nature of space), and of
Lobachevsky (on the parallel postulate), and of Riemann (on n-dimensional varieties)
had begun a foundational debate, a debate that, during the second half of the 19th century,
crossed Europe from Germany (with Klein, Pasch, and Helmholtz) to France (with Poin-
caré), and into Italy (with Veronese, Segre, Peano, and Pieri). Pieri’s most notable achieve-
ment in the field of projective geometry with the publication of his I principii della geometria
di posizione (The Principles of Geometry of Position) was recognized by Russell: “This is, in
my opinion, the best work on the present subject” [Russell, 1903, p. 382]. Pieri, indeed, start-
ing from the rigoristic positions of Peano emerged with an approach closer to that of Segre:
in mathematics the context of formal rigor does not always precede the context of the dis-
covery itself.
Pieri regarded the basic propositions of geometry as concepts that have no preliminary
meanings associated with them. He attributed a foundational and epistemological value to
the creative and syntactic moment, which had not yet been found in Peano’s perspective.
Thus Pieri contributed, before Fano [Freudenthal, 1957, 105–142], to the creation of the
geometric system that found its completion in Hilbert’s work. Pieri’s studies in geometry
represent the apex of the research of the Italian school in this field. This research brought
about the replacement of the positivistic geometric system, which was based on the concept
of metric–spatial intuition, by the modern axiomatic system, based on the concepts of order
and abstraction. This explains Pieri’s absolute indifference to the debates on the parallel
Mario Pieri’s address at the University of Catania 245postulate, introduced by promoters of non-Euclidean geometries, because such a postulate
is seen as irrelevant to foundational problems and because it can be freely resolved on the
basis of a legitimate choice between the Euclidean or Lobachevskian geometric system.
Pieri’s interest, therefore, is directed in the first place to general geometry, or geometry
of position, from which the principles of elementary geometry can also be deduced [Pieri,
1898–1899 (1980), 192; Freguglia, 1985, 223].
In Pieri’s vision, geometry becomes, therefore, the prototype of the hypothetico-deductive
sciences [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 409–410] and the means to reach a kind of positivism of deduc-
tive reason, which, nevertheless, is not sustained by an adequate philosophical apparatus. It
was not by chance that Pieri responded to Croce’s objections to the epistemological value
of geometry by providing practical justifications, the same justifications that, according to
Pieri, determined the affirmation of the infinitesimal calculus over the method of exhaus-
tion, of indivisibles, etc. [Pieri, 1907 (1980), 400–401]. Italian geometric studies, in the span
from Pieri’s education to his death, described a curve that, on the one hand, allowed Italian
scholars to go beyond the limits of the positivistic conception, and on the other hand,
brought about the slowing of their development, restraining the evolution of their thinking.
During the first phase, which could be defined as “heroic,” Italian mathematics was char-
acterized by the adoption of the great European innovations, many coming from Germany,
and by the creation of tools for the spreading of scientific knowledge. There followed a per-
iod of isolation from the international scene, in which the element of synthesis and the
direction of research were entrusted to the inclinations of single researchers, rather than
to a general organic project. In spite of this state of isolation, Italian mathematicians man-
ifested, more than those in other countries of Europe, a civic vocation [Galuzzi, 1980, 1078]
that became concrete in the necessity of binding together the growth of scientific knowledge
with the broader national culture. This, however, showed itself to be superficial, or even
antiscientific. The negative external scientific atmosphere brought about the introduction
of heterogeneous categories into Italian scientific research. For this reason, Italian scientific
research remained distant from continental European scientific research. Consequently, at
the beginning of the 20th century, Italian mathematicians strengthened their distinctive self-
sufficiency.
The decade marked by the Great War saw the final decline of Italian geometrical studies,
whether because the Italian school had become isolated from the international scientific
context, because of its incapacity to follow the development of geometric abstractionism,
or because of its incapacity to see the potentialities of the new geometries. In this period,
“a turning point is reached that already seems to deliver to the past, both the defeated
and the winners of just concluded battles” [Ciliberto, 1982, 160]. Pieri, perhaps even more
than Segre, was the one who managed with authoritativeness to insert himself into the
international geometrical debate. Yet his premature death at 52 led to the abandonment
of this work, just when it was becoming the fulcrum of the geometrical research of the
20th century [Marchisotto, 1993, 292–294; Marchisotto and Smith, 2007].References
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